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INTRODUCTION

Worldwide, future access to essential prescription
medicines remains undetermined as pharmaceutical companies
and governments try to balance affordability and availability
while preserving intellectual property (IP) standards.1 This dilemma is exacerbated in many countries of Central and South
America, where the infectious disease burden is great. 2 These
diseases, including HIV/AIDS, malaria, and tuberculosis, have
been eradicated or afflict a much smaller percentage of the population in more developed countries. 3 In Central and South
America, however, only 5 of the 34 countries in the region even
have the capabilities to manufacture pharmaceutical products
without importing ingredients. 4 Considering the public health
implications of restricting medication accessibility and the lack
of pharmaceutical resources, developing countries (DCs) and
least developed countries (LDCs) have been historically reluc5
tant to legislate IP criteria.
The affirmation of IP, such as the issuance of patents including those governing pharmaceutical products, are traditionally part of Western culture. 6 Patents are granted to give an
inventor the right to own his invention and to reward him for
his contribution to better some aspect of society.7 Most developed countries adopted these ideals and supported the development of the World Trade Organization (WTO), which
incorporated the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intel-

18,

1 See World Trade Organization, Cancdn: The Real Losers are the Poor (Sept.
2003), at http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news03-e/news-sp-18sepO3-e.

htm.
2 See Mary Moran & Nathan Ford, The G8 and Access to Medicines: No More
Broken Promises, 361 LANCET 1578 (2003), at http://www.lancet.com (last visited
Nov. 23, 2004).
3 See id.
4 See Carlos M. Correa, Implications of the Doha Declarationon the TRIPS
Agreement and Public Health, WORLD HEALTH ORG. ESSENTIAL POLICIES & MED. 13
(June 2002), at http://www.who.int/medicines/library/par/who-edm-par-2002-3/
doha-implications.doc (last visited Nov. 23, 2004) [hereinafter Correa, Implications
of Doha].
5 See John A. Harrelson, TRIPS, PharmaceuticalPatents,and the HIVIAIDS
Crisis:Findingthe ProperBalance Between Intellectual PropertyRights and Compassion, 7 WIDENER L. SYMP. J. 175, 187 (2001).
6 See id.
7 See id.
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lectual Property (TRIPS) in 1994.8 The overall goals of this
agreement were to promote advances in technology, distribution, and conveyance of new technological advances, and to play
a role in "the mutual advantage of producers and users of technological knowledge in a manner conducive to social and economic welfare." 9
Simultaneous to the WTO discussions on IP, trade, and the
development of TRIPS, talks emerged around the creation of a
free trade zone encompassing the Americas. The Free Trade
Area of the Americas (FTAA) is a proposed agreement modeled
after the North American Free Trade Act (NAFTA), to be made
among 34 democratic countries of the Americas, excluding
Cuba.' 0 Formal negotiations started in 1998 and are set to
culminate in December 2005.11 The success of the larger FTAA
agreement is founded on the smaller, usually bilateral, Free
Trade Agreements (FTAs) made between the United States and
a targeted country. 1 2 Concurrently, Canada is pursuing bilatFTAs with Central and South
eral and smaller multilateral
13
countries.
American
This article will focus on the recent developments of the
FTAA in light of the post-TRIPS negotiations. Some of the latest legislative decisions made by Central and South American
countries favor provisions that actually involve stricter IP stan14
dards than the original TRIPS agreement set forth. The discussion will review the effects of these additional provisions in
the negotiations of trade agreements with the United States in
8 See Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights,
Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization,
Annex 1C, Legal Instruments - Results of the Uruguay Round 31, 33 I.L.M. 1197
(1994) [hereinafter TRIPS Agreement].
9 M. Kent Ranson et al., The Public Health Implications of Multilateral
Trade Agreements, in HEALTH POLICY IN A GLOBALISING WORLD 18 (Kelley Lee et
al. eds., 2002).
10 Tanja Sturm, MSF Activists Urge Latin American Countries to Fight
'TRIPS-Plus' Provisions in FTAA Negotiations, WORLD MARKETS ANALYSIS, Aug.
29, 2003.

11 See id.

See Free Trade Deals: What You Don't See May Be What You Get, GLOBAL
ECONOMIC JUSTICE REPORT, V. 2(1), p. 1-12, February 2003 [hereinafter Free Trade
Deals].
13 See id.
14 See Rebecca Palser, "TRIPS-Plus" ProvisionsSet for Inclusion in US-Chile
FTA, WORLD MARKETS ANALYSIS, Nov. 28, 2002.
12
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the Central and South American region. This article will also
present new developments that focus on preserving public
health initiatives for access to essential medications.
Part II provides the historical background of the modifications and clarifications made to the TRIPS document regarding
pharmaceutical access over the past five years and the main
events leading up to these changes. In addition, Part II will
present a review of the proposed solutions for developing countries that, if implemented, would potentially appease TRIPS
proponents, yet continue to provide needy populations with essential medicines. In addition, Part II will continue with a discussion of the current status of applying TRIPS to public health
initiatives in DCs and LDCs.
Part III will discuss the formation of the FTAA, including
the purpose of the agreement, the countries targeted, and the
benefits of these agreements. The approaches to IP protections
and pharmaceutical access of three Central and South American countries, Brazil, Chile, and Guatemala, in preparation for
the FTAA, will be highlighted.
Part IV will examine the implementation of TRIPS through
the FTAA and smaller FTA agreements, specifically focusing on
the access to prescription medications and generic equivalents.
This section will also review the current status of the FTAA negotiations and the future outlook on pharmaceutical access for
Central and South Americans.
II.

TRIPS

DEVELOPMENT, REFINEMENT AT

DOHA,

AND

FUTURE OUTLOOK

One of the driving forces of developing the TRIPS agreement was to create universal standards for patents on pharmaceutical products. 15 The Intellectual Property Committee (IPC),
a' collaboration of 12 transnational corporations based in
America, along with the International Intellectual Property Alliance and the Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of
America, heavily influenced the conception of the TRIPS agreeSee TRIPS, IntellectualProperty Rights and Access to Medicines, HIV/AJDS
(WHO, Regional Office for the Western Pacific), Dec.
2002, at 1 [hereinafter HIV Newsletter].
15

ANTIRETROVIRAL NEWSLETTER
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ment. 16 The TRIPS agreement encapsulated many of the patent protections these corporations enjoyed in the United States
to worldwide applicability.17 Patents rights were broadened to
limit exceptions to these rights and to strengthen the restric8
tions on compulsory licensing of pharmaceutical products.'
While TRIPS set out minimum standards for IP protection, the
agreement also included enforcement and dispute resolution
procedures with a compliance date of January 2005 for all WTO
Members.19
The incorporation of TRIPS into the global pharmaceutical
industry by the 2005 deadline soon revealed that this agreement was going to have very broad applications to public health
initiatives around the world.20 Thus, the application of the
TRIPS agreement has been a source of controversy for pharmaceutical companies, governments, non-governmental organiza2'
tions (NGOs), and human rights organizations worldwide.
Essentially, "the introduction of... TRIPS standards ... delay
the marketing of generic version of new drugs, and, thus the
competition they entail. Hence it is anticipated that the prices
of new drugs will remain high for a longer period of time, which
will result in reduced access for many people, notably in developing countries." 22 However, right after the initial TRIPS
agreement was issued, NGOs and activists publicized the public
health implications of the agreement and the WTO has slowly
23
responded.
The main social deliberation has been whether patents on
24
pharmaceutical products are rights or privileges. Pharmaceutical companies purport to have the ability to limit the distribu16 See Susan K. Sell, TRIPS and the Access to Medicines Campaign, 20 Wis.
INT'L L.J. 481, 481, 485-89 (2002) [hereinafter Sell, Access Campaign].
17 See Carlos M. Correa, TRIPS Disputes:Implicationsfor the Pharmaceutical
Sector, QUNO.COM (June 2001), at http://www.geneva.quno.info/pdf/OP5.pdf (last
visited Nov. 23, 2004).

18 See id.

19 See Sell, Access Campaign, supra note 16, at 489. See also TRIPS Agreement, supra note 8, art. 65, para. 4.
20 See id. at 497.
21 See generally Susan K. Sell, Post-TRIPS Developments: The Tension Between Commercial and Social Agendas in the Context of Intellectual Property, 14
FLA. J. INT'L L. 193 (2002) [hereinafter Sell, Post-TRIPS].
22 See Hiv NEWSLETTER, supra note 15.
23 See generally Sell, Post-TRIPS, supra note
24 See Sell, Access Campaign, supra note 16,

21.
at 497.
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tion of drugs by claiming IP rights. 2 5 Many public health
advocates see the enforcement of patents as a privilege, where
the privilege can be revoked when there are higher reaching
goals such as public health emergencies. 2 6
The TRIPS agreement was not developed around an access
to essential medications or a public health initiative. Therefore,
the world's population has not had an opportunity to realize the
potential complications of the agreement made by trade and
business elitists, especially if IP is deemed a "right."2 7 In the
ensuing years since the enactment of the TRIPS agreement,
many activists, NGOs, and the World Health Organization
(WHO), have petitioned the WTO and its members to reconsider
the agreement in light of the public health implications on decreased access to pharmaceuticals.28
A.

WTO Ministerial Conventions Respond to Pharmaceutical
Access Concerns

The first ministerial convention to address the limitations
that the TRIPS agreement created on pharmaceutical access
was held in 1999 in Seattle, Washington. 29 At that time, there
was an enormous debate on the availability and pricing of antiretroviral (ARV) drugs for the HIV/AIDS epidemic in Africa. 30
In assumed compliance with TRIPS, the South African government, for example, had enacted the South African Medicines
and Related Substances Control Act Amendments. 3 1 The purpose of these amendments was to make ARV drugs affordable to
its infected populace. 3 2 After their enactment, many lawsuits
25
26
27

See id.
See id.
See John Braithwaite & Peter Drahos, GLOBAL BUSINESS REGULATION 576

(2000).

28 See Zita Lazzarini, Making Access to Pharmaceuticalsa Reality: Legal Options Under TRIPS and the Case of Brazil, 6 YALE HUM. RTS. & DEV. L.J. 103, 117
(2003).
29 See Ellen 't Hoen, Public Health and InternationalLaw: TRIPS, Pharmaceutical Patents, and Access to Essential Medicines: A Long Way From Seattle to
Doha, 3 CHI. J. INT'L L. 27, 34 (2002).
30 See id. at 30.
31 See Rosalyn S. Park, The International Drug Industry: What the Future
Holds for South Africa's HIVIAIDS Patients,11 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 125, 136

(2002).
32 See Debora Halbert, Moralized Discourses: South Africa's IntellectualProperty Fight for Access to AIDS Drugs, 1 SEATTLE J. Soc. JUST. 257, 269 (2002).

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol16/iss2/8
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ensued from pharmaceutical companies around the world.
Under much pressure from humanitarians and the media, President Clinton and other world leaders vowed to help South AfHIV/AIDS. 3 4
rica and other nations in their plight against
Regardless, the Seattle convention did little to change the exin all WTO-participating
pectations of implementing TRIPS
35
deadline.
countries by the 2005
In 2001, the WTO convened again in Doha, Qatar, shifting
and LDCs
their focus to the public health initiatives of DCs
36 Some signifwith the 2005 implementation deadline looming.
icant public health commitments were solidified at Doha in the
"Doha Declaration." 37 As stated in the declaration, "We agree
that the TRIPS Agreement does not and should not prevent
38
members from taking measures to protect public health." One
of the most significant benefits for DCs and LDCs was the exfor enacting TRIPS IP protections into
tension of the deadline
39
2016.
law until
B.

Proposed Solutions in the Doha Declarationon Public
Health

The Doha Declaration was created to address the ways that
DCs and LDCs could circumvent IP issues and gain access to
prescription medications, utilizing options under the TRIPS
agreement. 40 Specific articles in the TRIPS agreement allowed
for exceptions, including article 30 patent exceptions and article
4 1 Other alternative ways
31 compulsory licensing mechanisms.
to skirt restrictive IP laws, which may be feasible for DCs and
are parallel importing, patent exhaustion,
LDCs in the future,
42
and subsidies.
See id. at 261.
See id. at 272.
See 't Hoen, supra note 29, at 35.
See id. at 38.
See Correa, Implications of Doha, supra note 4, at 1.
38 World Trade Organization, Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreements
and Public Health, para. 5(c), WT/MIN(01)/DEC/2, at http://www.wto.org/english/
thewtoe/minist_e/min01_e/mindecl_tripse.htm (last visited Nov. 23, 2004) [hereinafter Doha Declaration].
39 See 't Hoen, supra note 29, at 41.
40 See id. at 40.
41 See generally Correa, Implications of Doha, supra note 4.
42 See Harrelson, supra note 5, at 197.
33
34
35
36
37
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Article 31 Exceptions

One of the major debates after the TRIPS agreement was
how DCs and LDCs could benefit from the compulsory licensing
mechanism described in Article 31. 4 3 A compulsory license is
defined as "[a] statutorily created license that allows certain
parties to use copyrighted material without the explicit permission of the copyright owner in exchange for a specified royalty."44 Historically, DCs and LDCs have not used compulsory
licensing to access essential medicines during public health crises. 4 5 However, under the Doha Declaration, much liberty has
been given to these countries to use compulsory licenses as a
tool for meeting their pharmaceutical needs. 4 6
There are a few other ways countries might utilize compulsory licensing and still be compliant with TRIPS.47 One mechanism is parallel compulsory licensing where the importing
country's compulsory license is duly recognized by the exporting
country. 48 While the mechanism appears simple, this solution
is procedurally difficult to implement. 4 9 For example, the ex43 See 't Hoen, supra note 29, at 40. TRIPS Agreement, Article 31(b)
states, in
part, "such use may only be permitted if, prior to such use, the proposed user
has
made efforts to obtain authorization from the right holder on reasonable commercial terms and conditions and that such efforts have not been successful within
a
reasonable period of time." TRIPS Agreement, supra note 8, art. 31.
44 See BLAcK's LAw DICTIONARY 931 (7th ed. 1999).
45 See Frederick M. Abbott, WTO TRIPS Agreement and Its Implications
for
Access to Medicines in Developing Countries, IPRCOMMISSON.ORG (Feb. 14,
2002).
Abbott provides several reasons why DCS have not used compulsory licensing,
including:
(1) The TRIPS Agreement has only recently begun to increase the incidence of patent protection; (2) use has been opposed by developed country
WTO Members and interested industry groups within them, and a strong
political commitment to act in the face of this opposition is required; (3)
some developing countries have expressed concern regarding a potential
backlash from foreign direct investors; (4) developing country enterprises
may find it easier to reach accommodation with foreign patent holders
than to challenge them through the compulsory licensing process for various economic and administrative reasons; and .

.

. (5) effectively imple-

menting compulsory licensing requires that certain preconditions related
to administrative, financial and technical capacity be met, and these conditions are often not met in developing countries.
Id.
46
47
48
49

See id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol16/iss2/8
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porting country is still required to retain the principal portion of
its product in the domestic market, and the exporting country
must have legislation in place to be able to accept the importing
country's license. 50 Other alternatives, such as regional patents
or creating pharmaceutical production export zones, are also
essential medicines,
available to countries in need of importing
51
widely.
but have yet to be utilized
D.

Other Flexibilities Under TRIPS

Article 30 of TRIPS also provides some narrow exceptions
52 The exporting
to pharmaceutical and other issued patents.
country is in charge of determining whether to authorize patent
exceptions under this regulation, following the criteria set out
from
in the Article. 5 3 Article 30 provides a different flexibility
54
The text
Article 31, as stated in footnote 7 of Article 31.
procelicensing
compulsory
clearly supports that Article 31
55
exceptions.
patent
30
Article
dures are distinguishable from
of
Some commentators have also recommended the practice
56 Paralpharmaceuticals.
get
parallel importation for LDCs to
lel importation is defined as "[gloods bearing valid trademarks
that are manufactured abroad and imported into57[a country] to
compete with domestically manufactured goods." Typically, a
drug manufacturer offers its pharmaceutical products at differ58 The benefit of parallel importing
ent prices around the globe.
50 See Abbott, supra note 45.
to51 See id. A regional patent system involves several countries coming
the
supplying
of
requirement
The
license.
gether to issue a common compulsory
domestic
domestic market could be met by classifying the group market as the
market. Id.
52 See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 8, art. 30.
53 See Abbott, supra note 45. See also TRIPS Agreement, supra note 8, art.
rights
30, which states, "members may provide limited exceptions to the exclusive
conflict
unreasonably
not
do
exceptions
such
that
conferred by a patent, provided
prejudice the
with a normal exploitation of the patent and do not unreasonably
interests
legitimate
the
of
account
taking
owner,
legitimate interests of the patent
of third parties." Id.
54 See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 8, art. 31. Footnote 7 to Article 31
30." Id.
states, "'Other use' refers to use other than that allowed under Article
55 See id.
56

Id.

57 See BLAcK's LAw DICTIONARY, supra note 44, at 1136.

58 See Thomas F. Mullin, Comment, AIDS, Anthrax, and Compulsory LicensDecisions on
ing: Has the United States Learned Anything? A Comment on Recent

9
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is that the countries can shop around the world for optimum
pricing. 5 9 The downside is that pharmaceutical companies realize a smaller profit margin with parallel importing, and in turn,
their interests in funding research and development for the infectious diseases that burden DCs and LDCs may be reduced. 6 0
The Doha Declaration also elucidated the use of patent exhaustion as a potential means for increasing pharmaceutical access. 6 1 Patent exhaustion has been defined as, "once the patent
holder has sold a patented invention, the patent holder has no
further right to exclude others from subsequent use, including
offering to sell or distribute the patented invention . . . "62
There are currently many limitations to patent exhaustion
under national laws. DCs and LDCs would have to adopt national exhaustion policies, which to date, they have been hesitant to implement.63
Subsidies are a consideration for assisting countries in obtaining much-needed drugs, especially for combating HIV/AIDS
epidemics.64 The International Intellectual Property Institute
(IIPI) put forth a plan that takes the focus off of the patent debate and shifts it towards pricing issues. 6 5 The proposal includes separating countries by ability to afford
pharmaceuticals, structuring prices based on this affordability
scale, and forming a worldwide "system of subsidies" for countries at the bottom of the affordability scale. 66 This plan, however, requires many stages to implement effectively, including
national exhaustion of patent rights, tiered pricing of
pharmaceuticals, bulk purchasing options, and a World Bank to
coordinate fundraising efforts. 6 7 Similarly, another potential
the InternationalIntellectual Property Rights of PharmaceuticalPatents, 9
ILSA J.
INT'L & COMP. L. 185, 192 (2002).
59 See id.
60 See Nabila Ansari, InternationalPatent Rights in a Post-Doha
World, 11
CURRENTS: INT'L TRADE L.J. 57, 65 (2002).

61 See Doha Declaration, supra note 38, para. 5(d).
James Thuo Gathii, The Legal Status of the Doha Declarationon TRIPS
and Public Health Under the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 15
HARv.
J.L. & TECH. 291, 308 (2002).
63 See id. at 309.
64 Harrelson, supra note 5, at 197.
65 See id.
66 See id. at 197-98.
67 See id. at 198-99.
62
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solution is to have the significant debt owed by DCs and LDCs
forgiven so as to enable 68them to redirect resources toward reducing disease burdens.
As trade and public health advocates discuss possible solutions for DCs and LDCs to comply with TRIPS, global support
for infectious disease treatment and prevention activities are
diminishing.6 9 This past July, for example, at the European donors conference to fight AIDS, tuberculosis, and malaria, the
70 Unfortunately,
donations fell short of the expected amounts.
as scientific technology has advanced with effective treatments
has not responded in
for these diseases, the world community
71
need.
getting aid to areas of greatest
E.

The Post-DohaEra: Lingering Issues

During the meeting at Doha, drafters of the declaration
readily recognized that the issue of compulsory licensing under
7 2 Paragraph 6 stated that,
TRIPS was not globally inclusive.
"We recognize that WTO members with insufficient or no manufacturing capacities in the pharmaceutical sector could face
difficulties in making effective use of compulsory licensing
7 3 Many supporters of the need
under the TRIPS Agreement."
for access to pharmaceuticals express that DCs and LDCs
inshould be allowed to use compulsory licensing if they 7have
4 Howcapabilities.
manufacturing
sufficient pharmaceutical
ever, some of the general interpretations of TRIPS would not
to utilize compulsory licensallow for an exception for countries
75
ing for public health initiatives.
Article 31 of the TRIPS agreement allows compulsory licensing to be used domestically but not for exportation, which
See id. at 200.
See Julio Godoy, Health: AIDS Fund Falls Short of Expectations, INTER
PRESS SERV., Jul. 17, 2003.
70 See id.
71 See id.
72 See Correa, Implications of Doha, supra note 4, at 17.
73 Doha Declaration, supra note 38, para. 6.
74 See Sell, Access Campaign, supra note 16, at 517.
75 See Thomas A. Haag, Comment, TRIPS since Doha: How FarWill the WTO
PAT. & TRADEGo Toward Modifying the Terms for Compulsory Licensing?, 84 J.
MARK OFF. Soc'y 945, 953 (2002).
68
69
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creates a host of problems for DCs and LDCs.76 Despite strict
conditions set for utilizing compulsory licensing, there are no
limits on the grounds for issuing these licenses.77 Under
TRIPS, Article 31(b) states in part that, "This requirement may
be waived by a Member in the case of a national emergency or
other circumstances of extreme urgency or in cases of public
non-commercial use."7 8 The Doha Declaration clarified that
countries can determine the circumstances of a national emergency, which can include public health epidemics.79 The declaration also provided that the term "emergency" does not
necessarily constitute only short-term crises.8 0
The main obstacle DCs and LDCs face for utilizing compulsory licensing is found in Article 31(f) of the TRIPS agreement.8 1 There are two intertwined issues within this section of
the TRIPS agreement. First, if a country cannot manufacture
the pharmaceutical product, it will not be able to import generic
drugs if the country exporting the drugs is under a compulsory
license.82 Second, when a country takes advantage of a compulsory license, the principal part of the manufacturing of the
pharmaceutical product must be to supply the country's domestic market, which limits the quantity of medications that can be
83
exported.
In addition, theoretical and logistic issues exist in suggesting the use of compulsory licensing for DCs and LDCs to
fulfill their prescription drug needs.8 4 Although somewhat debatable, pharmaceutical companies claim that strong patent
regulations are needed to counterbalance the research and development costs of pharmaceuticals.85 Also, countries must be
76

See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 8, art. 31. See also Sell, Access Cam-

paign, supra note 16, at 500.

See Correa, Implications of Doha, supra note 4, at 13.
TRIPS Agreement, supra note 8, art. 31.
79 See Doha Declaration, supra note 38, para. 5(b)-(c).
80 See Correa, Implications of Doha, supra note 4, at 14.
81 See Abbott, supra note 45. See also TRIPS Agreement, supra
note 8, art.
31(f). Article 31(f) follows that: "any such use shall be authorized predominantly
for the supply of the domestic market of the Member authorizing such use
. ...
Id.
82 See id.
83 Id.
84 See 'tHoen, supra note 29, at 44.
85 See Ansari, supra note 60.
77
78
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able to manufacture the pharmaceutical product without the
8 6 In addition, a country must be
support of the patent owner.
able to afford the royalties owed to the patent holder(s) to use
compulsory licenses 87
For countries that do manufacture generically equivalent
exportations of
pharmaceuticals, there are prohibitions on large
8 8 Very few DCs
lesser-priced drugs under compulsory licenses.
and LDCs have the capabilities to wholly produce the
89
pharmaceuticals they need, and import many of the products
90
to subsidize their pharmaceutical manufacturing industries.
Until TRIPS participation becomes mandatory in 2005, DCs
and LDCs that do not have the means of manufacturing
pharmaceuticals can take advantage of the exportation of ge9 1 Importation of generic medications by developed countries.
neric medications into DCs and LDCs, however, will become
increasingly difficult after full TRIPS implementation, even
though these DCs and LDCS have until 2016 to comply with
TRIPS. 92 Additionally, supplying countries may no longer be
able to export the pharmaceutical ingredients on which DCs
and LDCs have been relying (under Article 31(f)) after January
93
2005.
The Doha Declaration did not fully outline all of the flex94 A remaining
ibilities available under the TRIPS agreement.
option includes exceptions to the protection of test data under
Article 39.3 so that generic equivalents can be ready for market
9 5 The exceptions to patent
upon the expiration of the patent.
rights under Article 30 are also vague and ambiguous, and sub96 Additionally, some DCs and
ject to further interpretation.
LDCs do not currently patent pharmaceuticals and therefore
cannot utilize standard compulsory licenses as a means of ac86

87
88

89

90
91
92

93

94

See id.
See id.
See id.
See Correa, Implications of Doha, supra note 4, at 18.
See id.
See Ansari, supra note 60.
See Abbott, supra note 45.
See Correa, Implications of Doha, supra note 4, at 18.
See id. at 43.

95 See id.
96 Id.
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quiring medications.97 Other options may need to be created to
accommodate these countries, especially if they face public
health emergencies.
At the end of article 6 of the Doha Declaration, the Council
for TRIPS agreed to expedite the means of finding a resolution
to the "Paragraph 6" problem.9 8 The deadline was set for the
December 2002 to report back to the WTO General Council. 9 9
The TRIPS Council proposed the "December 16" or "Motta text,"
which had many provisions that would significantly complicate
the production of generic pharmaceutical products.100 The
"Motta Text" lacked the votes to be adopted; voters were swayed
by the viewpoints of many NGOs who found the text to be
ineffectual.l 0 l
F.

Failure of Canclin WTO Ministerialto Settle Doha Issues
In August of 2003, the TRIPS Council again convened to
review the issues of exportation of pharmaceutical products using compulsory licensing.102 The decision of the Council was to
apply a temporary TRIPS waiver where eligible DCs and LDCs
can import generic equivalents of patented drugs from manufacturing countries under compulsory licensing regulations.103
This waiver will be in effect until TRIPS is amended.1 0 4 Many
countries opted out of the importation provisions, but some DCs
retained the rights to utilize the waiver under times of national
emergency. 105
The interim waiver contains a 12-step process that eligible
countries must follow to evade TRIPS pharmaceutical access
97 See 't Hoen, supra note 29, at 44.

98 See Doha Declaration, supra note 38, para. 6.
99 See id.
100 Campaign for Access to Essential Medicines-M~decines Sans Fronti~res,
Doha Derailed: A ProgressReport on TRIPS and Access to Medicines, ACCESSMEDMSF.ORG 2, at http://www.accessmed-msf.org/documents/cancunbriefing.pdf (Aug.
27, 2003) [hereinafter Doha Derailed].
101 See id.
102 World Trade Organization, Decision Removes Final Patent Obstacle
to
Cheap Drug Imports available at http://www.wto.orgenglish/news-e/pres03-e/
pr350e.htm (Aug. 30, 2003) [hereinafter WTO Patent Obstacle].
103 See id.
104 Id.
105 See World Trade Organization, The General Council Chairperson's
Statement at http://www.wto.orgenglish/news-e/news03-e/trips-stat_28aug03-e.htm
(Aug. 30, 2003) [hereinafter Chairperson's Statement].
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barriers. 106 The steps include issuing voluntary and compulsory licenses, working with the exporting country, the private
0 7 The
manufacturer if involved, and the importing country.'
process is difficult to implement and must be repeated by the
exporting country each time there is a request for importing
pharmaceutical products by an eligible country.1 0 8 The Council
also explicitly restricted the use of compulsory licenses to those
covered by paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration in the
waiver.' 0 9
Some commentators thought that the waiver would be the
bridge to bringing trade negotiators and public health advocates closer to reaching a workable solution to the pharmaceutical access barriers created by TRIPS. 110 However, two new
challenges have been created for DCs and LDCs by the interim
waiver. First, DCs and LDCs do not have a clear interpretation
of their limitations and autonomy to gain access to affordable
medications."' Second, DCs and LDCs will need to propose a
workable and lasting solution to amend the TRIPS agreement. 11 2 Without the amendment, NGOs and public health
supporters warn that these new compulsory licensing terms do
not secure generic drug production for the future. 113 Even the
remaining crucial
most recent WTO Ministerial Conference left
114
unsettled.
issue
this
about
determinations
III.

PREPARING FOR THE FREE TRADE AREA OF THE

AMERICAS

A.

(FTAA)

Purpose and Benefits of FTAA

There has been an increasing trend for WTO-participating
nations to negotiate regional trade agreements, a trend coined
See Carlos Correa, Access to Drugs Under TRIPS: A Not So Expeditious
Solution, ICTSD.ORG 21, at http://www.ictsd.org/monthly/bridges/BRIDGES8-1.pdf
(Jan. 2004).
106

107

See id.

108 See id. at 22.
109 See Chairperson's Statement, supra note 105.
110 See WTO Patent Obstacle, supra note 102.
111 See Correa, supra note 106, at 22.
112

See id.

113

See Flawed WTO drugs deal will do little to secure future access to

medicines in developing countries, DOCTORSWITHOUTBORDERS.oRG, at http://www.
doctorswithoutborders.org/pr/2003/08-30-2003_pf.html (Aug. 30, 2003).
114

See Doha Derailed, supra note 100, at 1.
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"regionalism."1 15 There are several major initiatives happening
simultaneously. These include nations choosing regional trade
agreements (RTAs) over larger multilateral agreements, countries seeking to negotiate with new and distant partners, and
large "mega-blocs" of countries making one trade agreement,
such as the FTAA.116
The purpose of the FTAA is to increase the ease of trade
and investments in the Americas." 7 Along with the potential
for increased prosperity, the goals of the agreements include
supporting democracy, alleviating poverty and inequities, and
working with DCs and LDCs towards ongoing growth and development in many sectors."18 The pending agreements are
very comprehensive, including agriculture, IP, tariffs, and other
1 9
trade-related items.
115 See C.P. Chandrasekhar & Jayati Ghosh, Regional Trade and Investment
Agreements, Bus. LINE, Jan. 20, 2004.
116 See id.
117 See generally Antecedents of the FTAA Process, The PreparatoryProcess,
FTAA-ALCA.oRG (last visited Nov. 30, 2004).
118 See Free Trade Area of the Americas - FTAA: FirstSummit of the Americas:
Miami - December 19-11, 1994: Plan of Action, FTAA-ALCA.oRG (last visited Feb.
19, 2004) [hereinafter FTAA Plan of Action]. The FTAA Plan of Action lists
twenty-two goals in creating this agreement, including:
I. Preserving and Strengthening the Community of Democracies of the
Americas: 1. Strengthening Democracy, 2. Promoting and Protecting
Human Rights, 3. Invigorating Society/Community Participation, 4. Promoting Cultural Values, 5. Combating Corruption, 6. Combating the Problem of Illegal Drugs and Related Crimes, 7. Eliminating the Threat of
National and International Terrorism, 8. Building Mutual Confidence; II.
Promoting Prosperity Through Economic Integration and Free Trade: 9.
Free Trade in the Americas, 10. Capital Markets Development and Liberalization, 11. Hemispheric Infrastructure, 12. Energy Cooperation, 13.
Telecommunications and Information Infrastructure, 14. Cooperation in
Science and Technology, 15. Tourism; III. Eradicating Poverty and Discrimination in Our Hemisphere: 16. Universal Access to Education, 17.
Equitable Access to Basic Health Services, 18. Strengthening the Role of
Women in Society, 19. Encouraging Microenterprises and Small Businesses, 20. White Helmets-Emergency and Development Corps; IV.
Guaranteeing Sustainable Development and Conserving Our Natural Environment for Future Generations: 21. Partnership for Sustainable Energy Use, 22. Partnership for Biodiversity, 23. Partnership for Pollution
Prevention.
Id.
119 See Maria Julia Oliva, Intellectual Propertyin the FTAA: Little Opportunity
and Much Risk, 19 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 45, 57 (2003).
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The United States is the primary negotiator in the FTAA
agreement and the smaller FTA with individual countries and
groups of countries. Creating this trade zone is a crucial and
strategic expansion for the United States because as of two
years ago, the US was only participating in 1 of the 30 FTAs in
existence in the Western Hemisphere. 120 Some commentators
also report that by formulating these regional agreements, the
and
larger developed countries have more influence over DCs
12 1
negotiations.
agreement
WTO
LDCs during multilateral
The US faces direct trade competition from the European
Union.1 2 2 By utilizing politically motivated trade negotiations
to create FTA with particular countries, and remaining at the
forefront of the multilateral FTAA, the US can effectively
1 2 3 As
counter the trade competition with the European Union.
one commentator notes, "[m]aking agreements selectively perwhich it will almits the United States to choose the terms1 on
24
market.
its
to
access
low certain countries
B.

Countries Preparefor FTAA Integration

In Central America, more than 1.8 million people live with
HIV/AIDS, and the disease is the second leading cause of death
in the region.1 25 Generic drug availability has been the only
facilitator of driving down prices for ARV drugs needed to treat
this population. 126 The pending FTAA agreement is impacting
the access to prescription medications in the countries of Central and South in different ways, depending on how the country
chooses to negotiate with the United States in the smaller
120 Laura Altieri, Comment, Between Empire and Community: The United
States and Multilaterilism 2001-2003: A Mid-Term Assessment, 21 BERKELEY J.
INT'L L. 847, 867 (2003).
121 See Chandrasekhar, supra note 115.
122 See id. at 866.
123 See id.
124 See id. at 877.
125 See Make Trade Fairfor the Americas: Agriculture, Investment And Intellectual Property: Three Reasons To Say No To The FTAA (Jan. 26, 2003), at http://
www.oxfam.org/eng/pdfs/pp03Ol26FTAA.pdf [hereinafter Make Trade Fair].
126 See Press Release, Medicines Sans Frontieres, Congressional Decree in
Guatemala Hinders Access to Medicines (Jul. 14, 2003) available at http://217.29.
66
E
194.251/msfinternational/invoke.cfm?objectid=236090A9-D94B-4720-8EOCC
7884E4F6&component=toolkit.article&method=fullhtml&CFID=41273&CFTO
KEN=27519176 [hereinafter Guatemala Hinders Access].
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FTAs. Below are three examples of how countries are preparing
for the FTAA by integrating IP laws into their own legal systems or participating in FTAs with the United States.
1.

Guatemala

Approximately 67,000 people are living with HIV/AIDS in
Guatemala. 1 2 7 According to M~decines Sans Frontiers, only
1,500 of those afflicted are receiving ARV therapy due to the
cost of the treatment. 128 For those receiving treatment, the approximate cost per month ranges from $320 (USD) to $800
(USD), while the average monthly income in Guatemala is $160
(USD).129 At the present time, the medications in the ARV
course of therapy are not under patent in Guatemala, so the
generic drug market is accessible for NGOs and other groups to
assist the Guatemalan people in obtaining treatment for HIV/
0
AIDS.13
The Guatemalan Congress enacted the first IP restriction
on prescription medications in April of 2003.13 1 They enhanced
the Guatemalan Industrial Property Law to give five years of
market exclusivity to pharmaceutical manufacturers from the
date of registration of the drug patent in Guatemala. 13 2 The
impact of this decree is that the release of new, comparable generic drugs will be delayed because the drug regulatory agency
cannot use the inventor's data to approve generically equivalent
products during the exclusivity period.' 3 3 Unfortunately, this
law also extends to the production of pharmaceuticals even
where there is no patent on a particular drug.1'4 The restrictions on marketing authorization of test data create an access
barrier that cannot be remedied, as compared to patents, which
127 Campaign for Access to Essential Medicines-M~decines Sans Fronti~res,
Trading Away Health: Intellectual Property and Access to Medicines in the Free
Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) Agreement, ACCESSMED-MSF.ORG, at http:ll
www.accessmed-msf.org/documents/FTAAdoc.pdf (Aug. 2003) [hereinafter Trading
Away Health].
128 See id.
129 Id.
130 Id.
131 See Guatemala Hinders Access, supra note 126.
132 See id.
133 Id.
134 Id.
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can be overridden by compulsory licensing procedures. 13 5 Currently, in Central America, Guatemala is the only country with
136
test data exclusivity laws.
2.

Chile

Effective January 1, 2004, the FTA between Chile and the
United States was enacted. 137 The United States-Chilean FTA
includes several provisions that go beyond the TRIPS minimum
standards including compulsory licensing restrictions, limits on
test data use, and extended patent stipulations. 38 One of the
main negotiations was the use of a five-year protection on test
data, 39 which means that during this five-year period, the patent holder has exclusivity on its development data and generic
manufacturers cannot use the data to create less expensive versions of the pharmaceuticals while the drug is still under patent.' 40 In the long-term, test data exclusivity increases
will not be availmedication prices, because generic competition
41
able when the medication comes off patent.'
In Chile, there are more than 20,000 people living with
HIV/AIDS. 14 2 The FTA provisions, first and foremost protecting IP, are slated to have an enormous and deleterious effect on
the accessibility and affordability of ARV-therapy drugs and
others.' 43 The United States-Chilean FTA sets a precedent in
Central and South America for future bilateral FTA.14 4 The
United States has now solidified its bargaining power to include
higher IP standards in other FTA negotiations, similar to those
45
included in this agreement.
135 See Provisions in CAFTA Restrict Access to Medicines: Latin American and
CaribbeanCountries Urged Not to Include Such Provisionsin FTAA, 42ACCESSMED2 0 04
104 94
MSF.ORG, at http://www.accessmed-msf.org/publications.asp?scntid=
&contenttype=PARA& (Feb. 3, 2004) [hereinafter Provisions inCAFTA].
136 See Trading Away Health, supra note 127.
137 See Tanja Sturm, US-Chile FTA Negotiations Likely to Include "TRIPSPlus" Provisions, WORLD MARKETS ANALYsIs, Nov. 28, 2002.
138 See id.
139 Id.
140 Id.
141 Id.
142 See South America: Chile at http://www.nationmaster.com/country/ci/
Crime (last visited Nov. 30, 2004).
143 See Palser, supra note 14.
144 See id.
145 See generally Palser, supra note 14.
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Brazil

Brazil has been a model for the Latin American region on
providing access to affordable medications,146 especially to the
500,000 Brazilian people suffering from HIV/AIDS. 14 7 The government developed a national AIDS program to offer ARV therapy to all citizens with HIV/AIDS using generic medications.14s
Brazil was able to provide medications by negotiating discounts
on pharmaceuticals and domestically manufacturing generic
medications. 49 Through this program, the Brazilian government has reported a $2 billion (USD) savings over a 6-year period and has saved at least another half-million people from
being infected.' 50 The Minister of Health attributes the success
"of free universal HIV care: [to] ... (1) committed leadership
at
the top; (2) involvement of community and civil society groups
...
and (3) affordable medicines." 1 5 1
Brazil is in a unique position among the South American
countries. It is considered an upper-middle-income country and
the largest economy in the region, and has full manufacturing
capabilities for pharmaceutical products. 15 2 However, the disparity between the rich and poor is alarming, and this disparity
is an indicator of the inequalities of health status among the
Brazilian people, especially the poor.1 5 3
The government of Brazil has, so far, remained committed
to the health initiatives they have commenced despite pressures
from the US and other WTO members to force Brazil to comply
with proposed FTAA IP regulations. 5 4 Some analysts believe
that the US is pursuing bilateral and multilateral FTAs to potentially isolate Brazil and other opponents to the US trade
stipulations.155 One commentator noted that in looking at the
FTAA from Brazil's perspective, "the FTAA is not a genuine
See Trading Away Health, supra note 127.
See South America: Brazil at http://www.nationmaster.com/country/br/
Health (last visited Nov. 30, 2004).
148 See id.
149 See Lazzarini, supra note 28, at 128.
150 See id. at 129. See also Trading Away Health, supra note 127.
151 Id.
152 See Lazzarini, supra note 28, at 130. See also Correa, Implications of Doha,
supra note 4.
153 Id.
154 See Trading Away Health, supra note 127.
155 See Free Trade Deals, supra note 12.
146
147
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free-trade area at all but a preferential trading system that
at the expense of its Latin American
benefits the United States
15 6
partners."
trading
IV.

CLOSING THE

DOOR

ON PHARMACEUTICAL ACCESS IN

THE

A.

FTAA?

The Use of 'TRIPS-plus' Provisions in IP Legislation

The harsh IP rules that developed countries are trying to
push DCs and LDCs to legislate and incorporate into FTA and
the FTAA agreement go beyond the requirements of the TRIPS
agreement. 15 7 These stipulations are typically referred to as
'TRIPS-Plus' provisions. 158 The requirements include, "efforts
to extend patent life beyond the... TRIPS minimum, to tighten
patent protection, to limit compulsory licensing.. .or to limit ex59
ceptions which facilitate prompt introduction of generics."'
These provisions directly affect pharmaceutical patents.
One limitation is that the patent exclusivity would be extended
beyond the 20-year international standard, which was the mini160 This is espemum standard set in the TRIPS agreement.
cially troublesome for generic drug development if a patent is
delayed at issuance.' 6 1 In addition, the proposed FTAA gives
pharmaceutical companies the authority to have increased test
data protection for 5 years. 16 2 This provision would also delay
the introduction of generic pharmaceutical products because
companies have to wait 5 years before even starting equivalent
drug development.' 63 The TRIPS agreement does not require a
test data minimum standard in IP legislation, but the United
States has added it to the 'TRIPS-Plus' provision
negotiations. 164
156 See id. (quoting Alex Gourevitch, Lula's Rules: Brazil Could Undo Bush's
Trade Scheme, AM. PROSPECT, Nov. 8, 2002).
157 See Trading Away Health, supra note 127.
158 See id. (stating that, "'TRIPS-Plus' is a non-technical term, which refers to
any IP provision that is more stringent than the TRIPS Agreement requires.").
159 See 't Hoen, supra note 29, at 30.
160 See id.
161 See Sturm, supra note 137. See also Oliva, supra note 119, at 64.
162 See Make Trade Fair, supra note 125.
163 See id.
164 See US Pressure Threatening Access to Medicines in Central America:
CAFTA Negotiations Roll Back US Promises to Put Public Health Before Profits,
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While the proposed FTAA encompasses minimum IP standards similar to TRIPS, these rules have been cited as the most
stringent IP standards written to date. 16 5 There is much suspicion that the United States has two agendas in these trade
agreements, one with the WTO in supporting DCs and LDCs
public health initiatives and the other in light of favorable trade
agreements that incorporate stricter IP provisions. 16 6 According to the FTAA Plan of Action, the United States should be
supporting the "equitable access to basic health services" and
"promoting and protecting human rights," both of which may be
found to include access to essential medicines.1 6 7
This double standard in trade negotiations was most recently evident in the Cambodian accession to the WTO in August 2003.168 Cambodia agreed to add 'TRIPS-Plus' provisions
to their IP legislation after much pressure from the United
States, despite their national patent law passed in 2003 that
excluded pharmaceutical patents until 2016 as per the Doha
Declaration. 16 9 The United States also has many tactics to employ when enforcing IP rules, utilizing provisions in the smaller
FTAs, the FTAA negotiations, the TRIPS agreement, and trade
sanctions against violating countries.' 7 0
Recently, several countries, concurrent with their bilateral
FTA negotiations with the US, have enacted tougher IP laws
than the TRIPS agreement required. 17 1 The laws were effective
immediately instead of in 2005, the developed countries' TRIPS
at http://www.doctorswithoutborders.org/pr/2003/
12:13-2003_pf.html (Dec. 13, 2003).
165 See David Vivas Eugui, Intellectual Property in the FTAA: New Imbalances
and Small Achievements. In BRIDGES: ICTSD ANALYSIS 18-22 (2002), at http:l
www.iprsonline/ictsd/docs/VivasBridgesYear6N8NovDec2002.pdf (last visited
Nov. 30, 2004).
166 See US Seeks Further Restrictions on Generic Medicines for Developing
Countries, DOCTORSWITHOUTBORDERS.ORG, at http://www.doctorswithoutborders.
org/pr/2003/08-25-2003_pf.html (Aug. 25, 2003).
167 See FTAA Plan of Action, supra note 118.
168 See Access to Medicines at the WTO: CountriesMust Save Lives Before Celebrating Success, ACCESSMED-MSF.ORG, at http://www.accessmed-msf.orgtpublications.asp?scntid=12920039472&contenttype=PARA& (Sep. 11, 2003).
169 See id.
170 See Make Trade Fair, supra note 125.
171 See Nick Ashwell, Bilateral Trade Deal with US Takes Precedence Over
FTAA, Says Colombian Official, WORLD MARKETS ANALYSIS, Sept. 5, 2003. See
also Guatemala Hinders Access, supra note 126.
DOCTORSWITHOUTBORDERS.ORG,
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compliance date. 172 In addition, the FTAA is a binding agreement for all of the participating countries, so the IP requirements in this agreement would supersede the Doha
Declaration. The extended TRIPS compliance deadline of 2016
for DCs and 3 LDCs would be rolled back to the signing date of
17
the FTAA.
Draft proposals of FTAs between the United States and
these
some Central and South American countries are limiting
17 4 Under the
countries' abilities to utilize compulsory licensing.
FTAA and other agreements, participating countries would lose
5
Declaration. 17
much of the flexibility afforded in the Doha
Countries would only be allowed the usage of compulsory licensing "for public, non-commercial purposes, and during declared
national emergencies or other situations of extreme urgency." 76 This is especially troublesome for the DCs and LDCs
indecountries of Central and South America who do not 1have
77 because
pendent pharmaceutical manufacturing capabilities
the ability to import ingredients or pharmaceutical products
78
of the FTAA.1
will not be possible under the current draft
Some commentators warn that initiating patent programs
into DCs and LDCs may result in increased administration,
79 This seems likely if DCs
medication, and technology costs.'
and LDCs enact 'TRIPS-Plus' IP legislation, and are forced to
resort to more cumbersome patent exemptions to gain access to
medications. For these reasons, long-term benefits seem uncertain, particularly for the poorest countries. Bernard P6coul, director of the Campaign for Access to Essential Medicines,
sponsored by M~decines Sans Fronti~res, stated, "Generic competition is just starting to bring life-saving medicines into people's reach, but if FTAA imposes stricter rules, drug prices will

172

See id.

173 See Trading Away Health, supra note 127.
174
175

176
177
178
179

See Oliva, supra note 119, at 65.

See id.
Id. at 66.
See Correa, Implications of Doha, supra note 4, at 13.
See Oliva, supra note 119, at 66.
See Ansari, supra note 60, at 66.
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inevitably shoot up. Developing countries must resist pressure
to negotiate their people's health."180
B.

Current Status of FTAA Negotiations
In mid-September 2003, the United States entered into negotiations to create a multilateral agreement with Central
America.181 These talks were held in Managua, Nicaragua, and
many of the provisions on IP included 'TRIPS-Plus' provisions.182 Near the end of December of 2003, several countries
entered into the US-Central America Free Trade Agreement
(CAFTA).183 The participating countries included El Salvador,
Honduras, Nicaragua, and Guatemala.184 These countries are
some of the poorer countries worldwide, and the affordability of
pharmaceuticals is already severely distorted.185
The text of the agreement was made publicly available in
late January 2004 confirming the inclusion of 'TRIPS-Plus' provisions.1 8 6 Assisting this negotiation were the recent IP provisions included in the US-Chile FTA, new Colombian IP
legislation, and the current draft of the FTAA.187 Colombia is
also set to start its own bilateral FTA negotiations with the
United States in early 2004, concluding in July 2005.18 It is
speculated that the Andean Community Pact, including Bolivia,
Ecuador, and Peru, will most likely sign agreements similar to
CAFTA and the US-Colombian FTA. 8 9
IP standards have been a sticking point in the larger FTAA
negotiations.190 With the US signing the smaller FTAs containing 'TRIPS-Plus' provisions for IP protection (which apply to
FTAA agreement threatens access to affordable medicines in the Americas,
at http://www.doctorswithoutborders.orgtpr/2003/
08-28-2003_pf.html (Aug. 28, 2003).
181 See Henry Dummett, CentralAmerica to Discuss GenericDrugs with US
at
Free Trade Meeting, WORLD MARKETs ANALYsis, Sept. 11, 2003.
182 See id.
183 See Tanja Sturm, US-Central American FTA Set to Tighten
IP Protection,
WORLD MARKETS ANALYsIS, Dec. 18, 2003.
184 See id.
185 See id.
180

DOCTORSWITHOUTBORDERS.ORG,

186 See Provisions in CAFTA, supra note 135.
187

See Sturm, supra note 184.

188 See Ashwell, supra note 171.
189

See id.

190 See Matthew Haggman, Peter Zalewski, A Plan for Access, BROWARD
DMLY
Bus. REV., Nov. 19, 2003.
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many areas of IP, not just pharmaceuticals), the platform for
inclusion of these terms into the larger agreement has been established. 19 1 Commentators have implied that the smaller
FTAs serve as the "insurance policy against the potential failure of the FTAA." 19 2 Conversely, some countries are pushing
193 There is agreement that
for the WTO to decide the issue.
TRIPS standards should serve as the foundation for IP standards in the FTAA, but countries such as Brazil do not want to
increase the IP protection beyond minimum TRIPS
compliance.194
NGOs and other humanitarian groups continue to raise the
issue of the impact of infectious disease burdens in DCs and
95
LDCs that are not in the forefront of these negotiations.1
While HIV/AIDS is getting most of the press in the access to
pharmaceuticals campaign, there remain other diseases affecting millions of people, yet the research and development for ef196 For example,
fective pharmaceuticals is not being conducted.
in Central and South America, 18 million people are afflicted
with Chagas disease and over 100 million are at risk of contracting it.' 97 At present, only one pharmaceutical company is
98 As the patent propursuing any research on Chagas disease.
tections increase through the FTAA, research on Chagas disease and other infectious diseases that mainly affect the poor
will most likely decline because the pharmaceutical market is
not profitable. 19 9
Even as FTAA negotiations continue and more bilateral
and multilateral FTAs are signed with 'TRIPS-Plus' provisions,
there is another avenue of hope for better access to prescription
medications in DCs and LDCs. In October 2002, two Thai citizens with HIV prevailed in a suit against Bristol-Myers Squibb
191 See id.
192 See Free Trade Deals, supra note 12.

See Haggman, supra note 191.
See id.
195 See Gustavo Gonzalez, FTAA Talks a Matter of Life and Death, MDs say,
INTER PRESS SERV., Nov. 19, 2003.
196 See Trading Away Health, supra note 127. Chagas disease, which is caused
by a parasite, afflicts mainly poor people as the parasite-transmitting insects live
in the walls of mud and straw homes.
197 See id.
198 See Gonzalez, supra note 196.
193
194

199 See id.
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and the Thai Department of Intellectual Property.200 The litigation concerned the amendment of the patent on the ARV drug
didanosine by the defendants to include a dose restriction,
thereby extending its patent protection beyond the original
grant. 20 1 Commentators reported that Thailand had been
under substantial trade pressure from the United States to implement strict IP legislation at the expense of public health
initiatives .202
In finding for the plaintiffs, the court found that, "injured
parties . . . are not limited to manufacturers or sellers of
medicines protected by patent. Those in need of medicine are
also interested parties to the granting of the patent."2 03 This is
the first time where the Doha Declaration has been utilized in a
court ruling, supporting public health concerns over IP protections. 20 4 In addition, supporters of the access to essential
medicines campaign cite this decision as "set[ting] an important
precedent that essential drugs are not just another consumer
product but a human right, and that patients are injured by
patents." 20 5 This case could have many potential ramifications
towards better access to medicines in the Americas despite the
current and proposed trade agreements.
V.

CONCLUSION

The question still remains whether the price of drugs is really the focal issue. The WHO states that, "[aiccess to
medicines depends on many factors, notably rational selection
and use of drugs, adequate and sustainable financing, affordable prices, and reliable supply systems."2 06 Most drugs in DCs
and LDCs are obtained through self-funding due to a lack of
200 See Nathan Ford et al., The Role of Civil Society in ProtectingPublic
Health
Over Commercial Interests:Lessons from Thailand, 363 LANCET 560,
561 (Nov. 14,
2004), at http://www.thelancet.com.
201 See id.
202 See id. at 562.
203 See id. at 561 (quoting Aids Access Foundation v. Bristol-Myers
Squibb
Company & Department of Intellectual Property. The Central Intellectual
Property and International Trade Court, BC Tor Por 34/2544, RC
Tor Por 93/2545
2

( 002)(Thail.).

204 See id.
205 See id. at 562.
206 HIV Newsletter, supra note 15.
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0 7 Countries do not have the infrastructure
health insurance. 2
to support public health initiatives such as disease screenings,
counseling, surveillance activities, and partner notification programs, which are especially needed for HIV/AIDS prevention
and treatment. 20 8 DCs and LDCs have a shortage of public
health staff, including nurses, doctors, and other health workers, in addition to few facilities which have the experience 20to9
drug regimens.
provide treatment and monitor patients'
These countries also do not or are not able to provide community resources including health education, drug treatment, or
important social services
mental health care, which are equally
2 10
countries.
offered in most developed
Further complicating the situation are the structural issues
countries face, including, "low levels of economic development,
frequent population migrations, political instability, gender inequality, drug policies that promote risky behavior or further
marginalize drug users, and laws and policies that maintain
21 1 Due to their limited resources, the
any of these conditions."
importance of public health initiatives diminishes as a political
2 12 A different view of health factors
priority in these countries.
manifested by social epidemiologists encompasses, "fundamental determinants of health [such as] . .. income, socio-economic
21 3
race/racism."
status, social capital, social cohesion, and
With either view, the world must help DCS and LDCS
determine:
how to guarantee government commitment and resources to provide access to pharmaceuticals, especially during difficult economic times ... although the current intellectual property system
may be interpreted or modified, if necessary, to permit access to
drugs at affordable prices, the international community must still
sustainable domestic development
fulfill the long-term need for
2 14
capacity.
health
public
and

id.
Lazzarini, supra note 28, at 128.

207 See
208
209

Id.

210

Id.

211

Id. at 115.
Id.
Id. at 116.
Lazzarini, supra note 28, at 136.
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213
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As an example, ARV therapy treatment for HIV/AIDS is not
only expensive, but also requires a strict and complex schedule
for taking the medications.215 The rigidity of the treatment
schedule is to be followed to secure optimum drug performance,
and also helps to prevent the development of ARV therapy-re-

sistant strains of HIV.216

Potentially, the impact of issuing compulsory licenses, for
example, for these and other drugs could produce a lesser impact than projected; 2 17 however, the risk of not utilizing the options under TRIPS could lead to the revocation of the newest
waiver. Some commentators encourage cautious optimism,
stating that, "even in view of enormous human suffering due to
the HIV-AIDS epidemic, [an impact] may not automatically be
assumed, without further investigation, to be a 'measure necessary to protect public health' as it may be required by TRIPS
Article 8."218 If countries can get the pharmaceutical products
at an affordable price, however, the incentive to develop and refine the infrastructure to dispense medications is much more
likely.
There are a number of possible ways that trade agreements
and public health initiatives can coexist and benefit all parties
involved.219 The prescription drug needs of DCs and LDCs may
precipitate a new IP agreement or amendments to TRIPS provisions affecting essential medication production and/or importation. Any changes to the agreement however would require a
three-fourths majority vote of WTO members. 2 20 A further approach could be that each country's pharmaceutical needs
would be evaluated on a case-by-case basis to determine the appropriate level of IP protection to be afforded. 22 1 Another possibility includes adopting a "patently unreasonable" standard to
allow a country to procure evidence about its internal IP policy
standards, which might be in conflict with the TRIPS agree215 See Markus Nolff, Compulsory PatentLicensing in View of the
WTO Ministerial Conference Declarationon the TRIPS Agreement and Public
Health, 84 J.
PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'y 133 (2002).
216 See id.
217

See id.

218 Id.
219 See
220
221

Ranson, supra note 9, at 37.
See id.
See id.

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol16/iss2/8

28

2004]

THE POWER OF A PATENT

ment. 2 22 As the TRIPS provisions are mandatorily imple-

mented, the public health concerns of DCs and LDCs will most
likely be brought to the forefront. Hopefully, this will encourage these countries and developed countries to be better
global citizens about the world's health.
The FTAA is an important commitment to DCs and LDCs
from developed countries with existing effective public health
initiatives. 223 Unfortunately, these needs are being overlooked
during the FTAA negotiations and smaller FTAs due to the influence on negotiators to protect IP rights. As public awareness
of these issue grows, additional support for the public health
agendas of NGOs will most likely surface. Only then can the
pharmaceutical needs of the DCs and LDCs remain a top worldwide priority.
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